Now surely St. Thomas does say just this, and says it repeatedly. Beyondtexts already cited, listen to the following passage: "Everything that isin the genus of substance is composed by a real composition, because, beingsubstance, it is subsistent (independent) in its being. Hence its existence issomething other than itself, otherwise it could not by its existence differ fromother substances with which in essence it agrees, this condition being requiredin all things which are directly in the predicaments. Hence everything that isin the genus of substance is composed, at least of existence and essence (quodest)."  The beginning of this passage shows that the composition inquestion is not merely logical, but is real. Thus the passage says exactly whatthe first of the twenty-four theses says.
Must we then say that the Congregation of Studies was in error, when, in1914, it approved as genuine expression of the doctrine of St. Thomas, both thatfirst thesis here in question and the other theses derived from that first? Isit true, as the article just cited maintains,  that St. Thomas never saidthat, in every created substance there is, not merely a logical composition, buta real composition of two principles really distinct, one of these principles,essence, subjective potency, being correlated to the other, existence, which isits act?
But can we not say, with Averroes, that the soul is an impersonalintelligence, united with the body, say, of Socrates, in order to accomplishthere that act which we call thinking? No, again, because such a union, beingaccidental, not essential, would prevent the act of thinking from being in truththe action of Socrates. Socrates would have to say, not: "I think,"but instead: "It thinks," somewhat as we say, "It rains."Nor can we say, further, that intelligence is united to the body as motor, tomove and guide the body, since thus it would follow that Socrates would not be anatural unity, would not have one nature only. .
Is there possibly only one soul for all human bodies? No, because it wouldfollow that Socrates and Plato would be simply one thinking subject, and theone's act of thinking could not be distinguished from that of the other. .
The rational soul is the substantial form of the human body, gives that bodyits own nature, for it is the radical principle by which man lives,vegetatively, sensitively, and intellectively. These various vital acts, sincethey are not accidental to man, but natural, must come from his nature, from thespecific principle which animates his body.
1432 Here is, in reduced form, the argument of Cajetan: Requiritur aliquidreale et positlvum quo subjectum existens est id quod est (contra Scotum). Atquehoc non potest esse nec natura singularis, quae se habet ut quo, nec existentiaquae est praedicatum contingens subjecti creati. Ergo requiritur aliquid aliudpositivum, quae est ultirna dispositio naturae singularis ad existentiam.
1412 We have, we may add, always admitted, as valid proof of God's existence,man's desire for happiness (see la IIae, q. 2, a. 8). But this proof presupposesthe ontological validity of the principle of finality; every agent, and in aspecial manner the rational agent, acts for a purpose.
1375 J. de Tonquedec, in his book Immanence, 1913, pp. 27-59, shows thelimitless consequences, unforeseen by its author, of the new definitions. Hereis one sentence from Tonquedec: "It will no longer be possible todemonstrate by argument (independently o action) the existence of God or thereality of the supernatural or the fact of divine intervention" (p. 28).
1364 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad I. For the principle of finality, which we donot treat here see our work, Le realisme du principe de finalite, 1932.
1362 In this formula the contradiction is less flagrant than if we said:Contingency is incompatible with non-contingency. But the most dangerouscontradictions are hidden contradictions (which abound in Spinoza). To deny thetenth characteristic of a circle is less evidently contradictory than to denyits definition, but it is still a contradiction.
1360 See the illuminating article of Al. Roswadowski, S. J.: "Defundamento metaphysico nostrae cognitionis universalis secundum S. Thomam"(Acta secundi Congressus thomistici internationalis): Rome, 1936, pp. 103-12.
Msgr. Noel means that the principle of contradiction is not an existentialjudgment, and we have never affirmed that it is. He who here drinks too freelyis the absolute realist after the manner of Parmenides. He was really drunk onbeing, when he affirmed that the universal exists just as it is conceived, whenhe confounded God's being with being in general. But, without drunkenness, oreven tipsiness, limited realism affirms that he who denies or doubts theobjective and absolute validity of the principle of contradiction will findevery existential judgment invalid, including "I think." Further,whenever we affirm the objective validity of the principle of contradiction, wehave simultaneously within us a spontaneous and indistinct judgment of our ownexistence and of the existence of the body from which we draw the notion ofbeing. There is a mutual relation between the subject matter of our knowledge(the sense object present) and the form under which the principle ofcontradiction conceives that matter. So close is this relation that to doubt theprinciple is to see vanish every existential judgment, just as matter cannotexist without form.
1359 Msgr. Noel, in the work just cited (see note 6) writes (p. 253):"We must not drink too freely the conquering allurement of certainformulas. True, the essential necessities seen by the intellect dominate allreality. They transcend all the limits of experience, since they rule themetaphysical order. But of themselves they do not in any positive way furnish usany reality."
1357 We must add here a remark of Msgr. Noel of Louvain. In his work, Lerealisme immediate, 1938 (chap. 12, "La valeur reelle de l'intelligence"):he has kindly quoted us often. We are essentially in accord with his view. Butwe must note that we are speaking here, not precisely of the real intrinsicpossibility, say, of a circle, but of the real impossibility of a contradictorything, a squared circle, for example. And we say that this impossibility is realand absolute, and that even by miracle it can have no exception. This necessityis not hypothetical as when we say: It is necessary to eat, even though we knowthat by a miracle a man could live without eating. The necessity we speak of isobjective and absolute