In a well known passage (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7–18; similar: Rhet. II.22, 1395b24–26), Aristotle says thatthe enthymeme often has few or even fewer premises than some other deductions, (sullogismoi). Since most interpreters refer theword ‘sullogismos’ to the syllogistic theory (see the entry on ), according to which a proper deduction has exactly two premises, thoselines have led to the widespread understanding that Aristotle definesthe enthymeme as a sullogismos in which one of two premises has been suppressed, i.e., as an abbreviated, incomplete syllogism. But certainly the mentioned passages do not attempt to give a definition of the enthymeme, nor does the word ‘sullogismos’ necessarily refer to deductions with exactly two premises. Properly understood, both passages are about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical incompleteness. The remark that enthymemes often have few or less premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the oratorcould make (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7–10): One can draw conclusions from things that have previously been deduced or from things that have not been deduced yet. The latter method is unpersuasive, for thepremises are not accepted, nor have they been introduced. The former method is problematic, too: if the orator has to introduce the neededpremises by another deduction, and the premises of this pre-deductiontoo, etc., one will end up with a long chain of deductions. Argumentswith several deductive steps are common in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a public speech to follow such longarguments. This is why Aristotle says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises.
ATLANTIS MYTH: A motif common in mythology in which an ancient, wise, or powerful civilization once existed in a past golden age but floods destroyed it. Plato popularized the myth in his works Timeaus and Critias, where he describes the arrogant island of Atlantis as an adversary of Greek civilization 9,000 years before his own day, but the gods disfavor the island's , and they submerge it into the Atlantic Ocean. Although Plato's references are brief, they have inspired some archeologists to link it with the Island of Thera (which was destroyed by volcanic erruption that triggered tidal waves devastating Minoan civilization in 1900 BCE). Likewise, they have inspired fiction writers to produce a number of later fantastic works. The allegorical aspects of the island influence Francis Bacon's New Atlantis, Thomas More's Utopia, and Stephen Lawhead's Taliesin. Among the Inklings, it plays a part in C.S. Lewis's The Magician's Nephew, where dust from Atlantis serves as a component of magical rings, as well as in Lewis's space trilogy. C.S. Lewis also uses it as a comparison to being overwhelmed by grief in his autobiography, Surprised by Joy. Charles Williams plays with the motif in Taliessin Through Logres. Other like J.R.R. Tolkien use the myth indirectly, as Tolkien uses it as an analogue in The Silmarillion, in which Númenor was a huge island in the Sundering Sea, west of Middle-Earth. These Númenorians grew obsessed with the search for immortality, and eventually their culture died when their island sank. In medieval legends, other analogues to the Atlantis myth include the legends of Logres and Lyonesse (which medieval tales located in the Atlantic Ocean southwest of Cornwall and Landsend), and older appear in Mesopotamian and Hebrew myth such as in the Old Testament accounts of the flood. A common erroneous claim is that flood myths are universal world-wide, though it actual point of fact, legends in which the world or a civilization die in floods primarily appear in cultures in geographic areas subject to regional flooding. Areas without such flooding do not tend to have Atlantis myths or flood myths.
Greek examples include Orpheus's expedition to rescue Eurydice from Hades, or Hades' abduction of Persephone to make her the queen of his realm, or Odysseus's necromantic conversation with the shades of his old comrades who regain their power of speech after drinking sacrificial blood from a lamb.
Rhet. III.1–12 introduces the topic of lexis,usually translated as ‘style’. This topic was not announced until the final passage of Rhet. II, so that most scholars have come to think of this section as a more or less self-contained treatise. The insertion of this treatise into the Rhetoric is motivated by the claim that, while Rhet. I & II dealt with thought (dianoia), i.e., about what the orator should say, it remains to inquire into the various ways of saying or formulating one and the same thing. In the course of Rhet. III.1–12 it turns out that Aristotle tackles this task by using some quite heterogeneous approaches. Afteran initial exploration of the field of delivery and style (III.1) Aristotle tries to determine what good prose style consists in; for this purpose he has to go into the differentiation and the selection of various kinds of nouns, one of which is defined as metaphor (III.2). The following chapters III.3–6 feature topics that areat best loosely connected with the theme of good prose style; among these topics is the opposite of good style, namely frigid or deterring style (psuchron) (III.3), the simile, which turns out to be connected with the metaphor (III.4), the issue of correct Greek (III.5), the appropriateness (III.7) and the means by which one's style becomes long-winded and dignified (III.6). Chapters III.8–9 introduce two new approaches to the issue of style, which seem to be unrelated to everything that has been said so far: These are the topics of the rhythmical shaping of prose style and of periodic and non-periodic flow of speech. Chapters III.10–11 are dedicated to how the orator can ‘bring things before one's eyes’, which amounts to something like making the style more vivid. Again metaphors are shown to play a crucial role for that purpose, so that the topic of metaphor is taken up again and deepenedby extended lists of examples. Chapter III.12 seems to make a new start by distinguishing between oral and written style and assessing their suitability for the three genres of speech (see above ). The philosophical core of Aristotle's treatise on style in Rhet. III.1–12 seems to be included in the discussion of the good prose style (see below ), however it is the topic of metaphor (see below ) that has attracted the most attention in the later reception up to the present day.
Accordingly, in Augustine's view, any hypothetically perfect things (like God or heaven in Christian theology) by definition do not and cannot change, and therefore these perfect things must not experience time as imperfect humanity does. They are sub specie aeternitatis, outside of time completely and viewing all things in the bubble at time simultaneously. Accordingly, states of time (past, present, and future) are merely illusions we experience. The past only appears to be over and the future only appears not to have happened yet because our mortal perception is limited to the present moment rather than experiencing all reality at once. In Saint Augustine's thinking, perfect and spiritual beings outside of time experience or observe past, present, and future simultaneously. For Saint Augustine, this idea of time allows God to have knowledge of future events and choices humans make while preserving human free will, suggesting God can know what choices we will make tomorrow (because we actually have already made the choices), without God necessarily causing those choices to happen through his own influence--foreknowledge without causation. In terms of God's perceptions, all those future choices already happened and are done with--humans just don't know it yet.
Originally the discussion of style belongs to the art of poetry rather than to rhetoric; the poets were the first, as Aristotle observes, to give an impulse for the study of style. Nevertheless he admits that questions of style or, more precisely, of different ways to formulate the same subject, may have an impact on the degree of clarity: “What concerns the topic of lexis, however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way ratherthan another makes some difference in regard to clarity; although nota great difference…” (Rhet. III.1, 1404a8–10). Clarity again matters for comprehension and comprehensibility contributes to persuasiveness. Indeed Aristotle even claims that the virtue or excellence (aretê) of prose style ultimately depends on clarity, because it is the genuine purpose of a speech is to make something clear. In prose speeches, the good formulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one. However, saying this is not yet enough to account for the best or excellent prose style, since clear linguistic expressions tend to be banal or flat, while good style should avoid such banality. If thelanguage becomes too banal it will not be able to attract the attention of the audience. The orator can avoid this tendency of banality by the use of dignified or elevated expressions and in general by all formulations that deviate from common usage. On the one hand, uncommon vocabulary has the advantage of evoking the curiosity of an audience. On the other hand the use of such elevated vocabulary bears a serious risk: Whenever the orator makes excessive use of it, the speech might become unclear, thus failing to meet the default requirement of prose speech, namely clarity. Moreover, if thevocabulary becomes too sublime or dignified in relation to prose's subject matter (Aristotle assumes it is mostly everyday affairs), theaudience will notice that the orator uses his words with a certain intention and will become suspicious about the orator and his intentions. Hitting upon the right wording is therefore a matter of being clear, but not too banal; In trying not to be too banal, one must use uncommon, dignified words and phrases, but one must be careful not to use them excessively or inappropriately in relation toprose style and the typical subject matter of prose speeches.
(b) The success of the persuasive efforts depends on the emotional dispositions of the audience; for we do not judge in the same way when we grieve and rejoice or when we are friendly and hostile. Thus,the orator has to arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to modify our judgments: to a judge who is in a friendly mood, the person about whom he is going to judge seems not to do wrong or only in a small way; but to the judge who is in an angry mood, the same person will seem to do the opposite (cp. Rhet. II.1, 1378a1ff.). Many interpreters writing on the rhetorical emotions weremisled by the role of the emotions in Aristotle's ethics: they suggested that the orator has to arouse the emotions in order (i) to motivate the audience or (ii) to make them better persons (since Aristotle requires that virtuous persons do the right things togetherwith the right emotions). Thesis (i) is false for the simple reason that the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgment (krisis), not an action or practical decision (prohairesis). Thesis (ii) is false, because moral educationis not the purpose of rhetoric (see above ), nor could it be effected by a public speech: “Now if speeches were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are … they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness.” (EN X.9. 1179b4–10)
Of course, Aristotle's rhetoric covers non-argumentative tools of persuasion as well. He tells the orator how to stimulate emotions andhow to make himself credible (see below ); his art of rhetoric includes considerations about delivery and style (see below ) and the parts of a speech. It is understandable that several interpreters found an insoluble tension between the argumentative means of pertinent rhetoric and non-argumentative tools that aim at what is outside the subject. It does not seem, however, that Aristotle himself saw a major conflict between these diverse tools ofpersuasion—presumably for the following reasons: (i) He leaves no doubt that the subject that is treated in a speech has the highestpriority (e.g. Rhet. III.1, 1403b18–27). Thus, it is not surprising that there are even passages that regard the non-argumentative tools as a sort of accidental contribution to the process of persuasion, which essentially proceeds in the manner of dialectic (cp. Rhet. I.1, 1354a15). (ii) There are, he says (III.1, 1404a2f.), methods that are not right, but necessary because of certain deficiencies of the audience. His point seems to be that the argumentative method becomes less effective, the worse the condition of the audience is. This again is to say that it is due to the badness of the audience when his rhetoric includes aspects that are not in line with the idea of argumentative and pertinent rhetoric. (iii) In dealing with methods of traditional rhetoric, Aristotle obviously assumes that even methods that have traditionallybeen used instead of argumentation can be refined so that they support the aim of an argumentative style of rhetoric. The prologue of a speech, for example, was traditionally used for appeals to the listener, but it can also be used to set out the issue of the speech,thus contributing to its clearness. Similarly, the epilogue has traditionally been used to arouse emotions like pity or anger; but assoon as the epilogue recalls the conclusions reached, it will make the speech more understandable.
Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between banal clarity, which is dull, and attractive dignity, which is inappropriate in public speeches, how can the orator manage to control the different degrees of clarity and dignity? For this purpose Aristotle equips the orator with a classification of words (more or less the same classification can also be found in Poetics chapter 21): First of all Aristotle distinguishes between the kuria onamata, the standard expressions, and theglôtta, the borrowed words, idioms or vernacular expressions. Most examples that Aristotle gives of this latter class are taken from the different Greek dialects, and most examples of this type are in turn taken from the language of the Homeric epos. Further classes are defined by metaphors and by several expressions that are somehow altered or modified, e.g., newly coined expressions (pepoiêmena), composite expressions (especially new orunusual compositions (ta dipla)), and lengthened, shortened or otherwise altered expressions. Sometimes Aristotle also uses the term kosmos under which he collects all epithets and otherwise ornamental expressions. These different types of words differ in accordance with their familiarity. Most familiar are the usual or current words, the least familiar words are the glôtta or words that are newly coined. The metaphors are also unknown and unusual, because a usual, well-known word is used to designate something other than its usual designation (see below ). The best established words, the kuria, make their subject clear, but do not excite the audience's curiosity, whereas all other types of words are not established, and hence have the sort of attraction that alien or foreign things used to have. Since remote things are admirable (thaumaston) and the admirable is pleasant, Aristotle says, one should make the speech admirable and pleasant by the use of such unfamiliar words. However one has to be careful not to use inappropriately dignified or poetic words in prosespeech. Thus the virtue of style is accomplished by the selection andbalanced use of these various types of words: Fundamental for prose speech is the use of usual and therefore clear words. In order to make the speech pleasant and dignified and in order to avoid banalitythe orator must make moderate use of non-familiar elements. Metaphor plays an important role for prose style, since metaphors contribute, as Aristotle says, clarity as well as the unfamiliar, surprising effect that avoids banality and tediousness.