No privacy walls in latrine
Two Generals having to share a bungalow with only one aide
He then broke back in to the camp and went to sleep. I could find no record of who the general was, but following is a list of the 37 officers that were there. It is believed the lower-ranking officers were at the camp as aides to the generals. In addition to these officers, who lived in private houses on the camp grounds, there were several hundred enlisted men held at the camp as prisoners of war. They were housed in barracks; the foundations of many still remain on the site just south and east of Clinton. The list of officers includes:
The theme of the double, or the mirror, and the mind-boggling confusion it can create is presented full force in the opening chapters. There are twelve girls chosen to work on this special college issue and straight away, Esther mentions Betsy and Doreen, sort of her heaven and hell. Doreen is the voice of naughtiness, a girl from the south. Betsy is very conservative and comes from Kansas and comes closer to Esther in personality and work ethic. Doreen wants to see and experience as much of New York as she can, Esther would too, but her head and thoughts interfere with letting loose her naiveté. The first time Doreen's name is mentioned, it's mentioned ominously, "I guess one of my troubles was Doreen" (BJ 1).
Esther enters the private hospital of Dr. Gordon () with a wise apprehension, almost telling that in the end, she'd not end up like the crazy people already there. She says, "What bothered me was that everything about the house seemed normal, although I knew it must be chock-full of crazy people" (BJ 12). She then walks passed several of the crazies and she calls them "shop dummies."
In a series of three quick scenes we go back to Esther and Dr. Gordon, Esther in the park reading the scandals sheets, and Esther's poor attempt to flee Boston for Chicago. Esther tells Dr. Gordon she feels the same at which point Dr. Gordon speaks to her mother privately and recommends electroshock therapy. Mrs. Greenwood reappears in tears and tells Esther. She sits eating peanuts and reading about suicides in the park and decides then, the day before her first shock treatment, to run away to Chicago. She couldn't hitchhike, as she doesn't know directions. In the end she becomes paranoid about taking money out from the bank because the banks might have heard about her situation and put a block on her account; an absurd thought. She then just takes the next bus back home to where her problems are.
A nurse leads her into a 'bare room at the back of the house,' and preps her for the treatment, removing her belongings: watch, hairpins, etc. The nurse also greases her temples, all to have her ready for the nightmarish ride of her life. In a very awful scene, only a few paragraphs in length, Esther bits down on the wire. "Then something bent down and took hold of me and shook me like the end of the world. Whee-ee-ee-ee-ee, it shrilled, through an air crackling with blue light, and with each flash a great jolt drubbed me till I thought my bones would break and the sap fly out of me like a split plant" (BJ 12). (This scene reminds me of "The Hanging Man", a poem Plath wrote in 1960, about a year before she drafted .)
begins harmlessly enough by openly questioning the legitimacy of the Huertgen operation and describing the brutality of the fighting and the harshness of the unforgiving terrain. In spite of the hardships of life at the front, Whiting describes the efforts that were made to provide some rest and recreation for the American infantrymen. Whiting tells of Red Cross club mobiles set up in the Rear where ladies would hand out doughnuts and free coffee to the tired troops. There were also United Service Organization (USO) Shows that included such celebrities as German-born Marlene Dietrich. From this point, however, this informative account takes a turn for the worse.
Since the book deals primarily with the 28th Division's ordeal in the Huertgen Forest, the 8th Infantry Division is mentioned only briefly when, from 16-20 November the latter "arrived to replace the worn out and haggard men" of the "Bloody Bucket."
Cota's second mistake involved failing to gather adequate intelligence about the enemy. The author states that the Division G-2 section (Intelligence) knew about the German and but fell short in detecting the existence of a third division - the . Currey has also determined that General Cota's intelligence officers did not pick up on the fact that the 89th Division had also been beefed up with Reserve Grenadier Regiment 1023, 189th Füsilier Battalion, 5th, 9th, and 14th Luftwaffe Battalions, as well as 1403 Festung Infantry Battalion. Here, Currey's point becomes somewhat contradictory when the author neglects to elaborate on his earlier reference of "battered remnants" and his suggestion that Cota's ignorance of the "extremely heterogeneous" forces that waited in front of him led to his failure to perceive that they suddenly posed a threat.
Currey begins by describing the origins of the 28th Division attacks in the Huertgen Forest. It may be recalled that as the American forces were poised along the German frontier in the fall of 1944, it was determined that the U.S. VII Corps under the command of Major General J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins would lead the main drive to cross the Roer and ultimately the Rhine Rivers with Germany's third largest city of Cologne as its main objective. General Collins feared the Huertgen Forest could act as a possible staging area for a German counterattack into the right flank of VII Corps. Both Generals Hodges and Collins agreed the Huertgen Forest was too big an obstacle to be by-passed. It was therefore decided to neutralize the forest. Briefly describing the failure of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division during October 1944, the author introduces the November offensive of General Gerow's V Corps and the U.S. 28th Infantry Division respectively. The operation was deemed a diversionary attack to draw enemy forces away from Collins's VII Corps.
If Charles B. MacDonald set the precedent for accurate, objective investigation of the Huertgen Forest battles, Cecil B. Currey set the pattern for blame. , Cecil B. Currey documents the mishandling of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division's ill-fated series of attacks on the heavily fortified German town of Schmidt. In a period of two weeks (November 2-16, 1944), the 28th Pennsylvania National Guard Division was nearly wiped out to the point of ineffectiveness in the Huertgen Forest. Writing from the infantryman's perspective, Currey asks why were these men sacrificed in this senseless battle of attrition? Currey places the blame squarely on inept leadership at the upper levels of American command. More precisely, Currey blames four distinct individuals: Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, "his was always the final voice declaring strategic courses of the war"; Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, commander of First U.S. Army, "intemperate, unforgiving, and brittle, caught between leading First Army himself and allowing [his chief of staff Major General William B.] Kean to do so in his name"; Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, commander of U.S. V Corps, "concerned more with having to reshuffle his divisions and boundaries than with basic inadequacies in Hodges' thinking"; and Brigadier General Norman D. "Dutch" Cota, having recently taken over command of the 28th Division on 13 August 1944. This theme of inadequate leadership straight up the chain of command from division to army forms the central thesis of this book. The book's title, a play on the slogan of the infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in a sense means - Hodges, Gerow, and Cota - . Clearly, Currey employs the "incompetent leadership" model to formulate his argument throughout.
Within this intriguing account, MacDonald makes two important points. First, contrary to the official volume that emphasizes the campaign took place within the context of a much broader picture; he contends the Huertgen Forest gradually developed into its own separate struggle. With Aachen on his left, and the Huertgen Forest on his right, it may be recalled, General J. Lawton Collins of VII Corps had only a six-mile opening of the Stolberg Corridor, to make his main effort. Initial probes and a "Reconnaissance in Force" eventually grew into a full-fledged struggle. In less damaging language, the author maintains that the American commanders did not expect serious resistance. The failure of the 9th Division, however, spelled trouble and set the tone of the campaign to follow.