Let us have a look at an example of a very short, self-containing article, posted in April 1999 on the website. This short article can be read in minutes and can serve as a positive incentive towards adjustments in your diet.
Passively processed ideas in the form of sentences rarely leave a durable trace in your memory even if they are reviewed regularly. Very often, as soon as after 2-3 months, you will notice that at review time, you actually do not seem able to recall that you have ever had a given sentence in your . You will quickly discover that you need active recall in order to remember. Active recall is a process in which you must answer questions. For example, you may be presented with a picture of and be asked to recognize his face. In the long run, you need to replace with . Otherwise, your memory of the fact will not be permanently consolidated.
However, there subsists in the public mind a faint unease about budget deficits. While no longer believing that a state that gets ever deeper into debt will finish by going bankrupt, many sensible people are worried about the propriety of the government doing something on behalf of its citizens that it would be imprudent if not downright wrong for the citizens to do for themselves. It is worth looking more closely at the mainsprings of this unease.
Let us consider as an example. The source material for the article included its , several articles related to sleep and published at , as well as a great deal of basic knowledge taken from various scholarly sources involved in sleep research. Those materials were supplemented with the review of knowledge of sleep from a general knowledge compiled by the author. The whole process started from a massive review of the entire material with incremental learning. The construction of a rough outline of the structure of the article proceeded in parallel (in the ). Supplementary materials were imported to fill in or complement individual pieces of knowledge. Figures, annotations, links, and literature citations were also processed incrementally in order of . This process quickly resulted in an article bloat, however, this was a bloat of valuable information rather than a bloat of excess writing. Towards the end of the process, individual from SuperMemo were imported to a single-page wiki. Some manual wikification was necessary at that step. Alternatively, multi-page wikis, blogs, or plain-HTML sites could have been used as the target of exports from SuperMemo.
What happens under this hypothesis as we move over time depends primarily on the average rate of growth of GNP. Assuming that the zone as a whole achieves growth at 2 percent a year looks optimistic from the perspective of the dismal present, but should be feasible with only reasonable luck. Consider a ten-year time span—not a long time for a currency union. At the end of Year 1, GNP rises from 100 to 102 and the national debt from 60 to 63. At the end of Year 10, GNP is at 122. The national debt rises to 93, which amounts to 76.4 percent of GNP. The longer the period considered, the more glaring becomes the effect of the growth of the debt being faster than the growth of national income.
The success of ERM countries in reducing inflation has led to much analysis of whether ERM membership has given rise to policy credibility effects. This article examines the analytical foundations of the credibility hypothesis, reviews the econometric evidence on whether or not credibility contributed to low-cost disinflation in ERM countries and provides independent estimates of possible credibility effects since 1987. The article finds some policy credibility effects in financial markets in the second half of the 1980s, but there is little evidence that credibility effects in labour or product markets have significantly reduced the costs of disinflation.
Public goods are freely accessible to all members of a given public, each being able to benefit from it without paying for it. The reason standard theory puts forward for this anomaly is that public goods are by their technical character There is no way to exclude a person from access to such a good if it is produced at all. Examples cited include the defense of the realm, the rule of law, clean air, or traffic control. If all can have it without contributing to its cost, nobody will contribute and the good will not be produced. This, in a nutshell, is the public goods dilemma, a form of market failure which requires taxation to overcome it. Its solution lies outside the economic calculus; it belongs to politics.
is not a form of review. However, it makes it possible to shorten the intervals and speed up the review. For example, if your exam comes in 100 days, you can shorten all intervals in a subset to less than 100 days with .
On one hand you can proceed with your , on the other, you can smuggle some subset review in between. For example, you might learn about the superiority of "intermittent fasting" over "fasting". You will want to investigate the subject to perhaps employ it in your lifestyle. However, you do not want the subject to be buried in thousands of articles you keep reading. Nor do you want it to monopolize your learning time on a given day. You can import several articles on intermittent fasting and spread them sparsely in your outstanding queue with Add to outstanding. By the end of the day, you will have a peek at all those articles, have them all well prioritized, and integrated with the learning process (in proportion to the value of the newly discovered content).
There is one type of exclusion cost that is more important by far than all the rest in putting a good in the public category: it is social preference. It is intangible and is only revealed by the choices it inspires. A pure example is a children’s playground. Access to it is excludable at low cost by a fence and a ticket collector at the gate. However, society would suffer deep moral embarrassment if rich children could use the playground but poor ones could only watch them from the outside. Therefore real exclusion cost would be unbearably high, and children’s playgrounds are provided as public goods.
There are other, less pure but quantitatively far more important examples. One is free universal education. Most countries provide it to age sixteen, some to university degree level. In this case, technical-logistical exclusion cost would be quite low (indeed, in a broad sense negative as exclusion would permit student selection, and that would in turn lower production cost), but social ethics would not tolerate the exclusion of poor, dumb, and subscholarship standard pupils. With education becoming a public good affording free access, the share of public goods in the national product expands vastly. Organizing health care in the form of a free-access public good on the pattern of the British National Health Service expands the domain of public goods even further and multiplies the gravity of the public goods dilemma.
This paper analyses the effects of unilateral action by one country/region to curb CO2 emissions on both other countrie's emissions - the so-called "carbon leakages" - and changes in sectoral comparative advantage. Several GREEN simulations were run with one or all OECD countries/regions imposing a carbon tax with the aim of stabilising their emissions relative to the 1990 levels. The results suggest that the leakage rate would be small, contradicting the findings of other researchers. In order to test the robustness of this GREEN result, a sensitivity analysis was undertaken with respect to the supply elasticities of fossil fuels and the price elasticity of trade flows. The main conclusion is that the key parameter determining the size of the leakage rate is the supply elasticity of coal.