As a general policy, NSF limits the salary compensation requested in the proposal budget for senior personnel to no more than two months of their regular salary in any one year. This limit includes salary compensation received from all NSF-funded grants. This effort must be documented in accordance with 2 CFR § 200, Subpart E, including 2 CFR § 200.430(i). If anticipated, any compensation for such personnel in excess of two months must be disclosed in the proposal budget, justified in the budget justification, and must be specifically approved by NSF in the award notice budget. Under normal rebudgeting authority, as described in Chapters and , a recipient can internally approve an increase or decrease in person months devoted to the project after an award is made, even if doing so results in salary support for senior personnel exceeding the two month salary policy. No prior approval from NSF is necessary as long as that change would not cause the objectives or scope of the project to change. NSF prior approval is necessary if the objectives or scope of the project change.
It is universally accepted that to perform an evil action an agentmust be morally responsible for what she does. Although hurricanes andrattle snakes can cause great harm, they cannot perform evil actionsbecause they are not moral agents. Furthermore, moral agents onlyperform evil actions when they are morally responsible for what they doand their actions are morally inexcusable (see e.g., Kekes 2005; Card2010; Formosa 2008). To meet these conditions evildoers must actvoluntarily, intend or foresee their victim's suffering, and lackmoral justification for their actions. It is particularly controversialwhether these conditions are met in three sorts of cases: (1) seriousharms brought about by psychopaths; (2) serious harms brought about byindividuals who have had bad upbringings; and (3) serious harms broughtabout through ignorance.
Georgia Institute of Scepticism and Justification – AC GraylingBut not only is scepticism not well described as the thesis that we are ignorant, it is not even well described as an attitude of doubt.
“normal justification thesis”:.Claim,Reasoning, Evidence, Justification | RVRHS…Claim,Reasoning, Evidence, Justification.
Your critics can challenge the validity or relevance of your findings if they believe there was something non-typical about the people you selected for study, something biased in the Beyond the normal justification thesis: jurisdiction in…Beyond the Normal Justification Thesis: Jurisdiction in the Service Conception of.
But when voluntary submission to an authority is absent, Raz suggests that the “Normal Justification” Thesis applies.
The proposed countries are Australia, Malaysia and the UK with the purpose of identifying The Normal Justification Thesis – (SSRN) PapersJoseph Raz's famous theory of authority is grounded in three claims about the nature and justification of authority.
According to Card, marriage and motherhood are evil institutionsbecause it is reasonably foreseeable that their normal, or correct,operation will lead to intolerable harm in the form of domestic abusewithout justification or excuse (Card 2002, 139–165). Forinstance, Card argues that the normal, or correct, operation ofmarriage leads to spousal abuse “because it provides incentivesfor partners to stay in broken relationships, places obstacles in theway of escaping from broken relationships, gives perpetrators of abusevirtually unlimited rights of access to their victims, and makes someforms of abuse difficult or impossible to detect or prove”(Calder 2009, 28). Card argues that there is no moral justificationfor the intolerable harm that results from the institution of marriagesince nothing prevents us from abolishing marriage in favour of otherless dangerous institutions.
Since coherentism can be construed in different ways, it is unlikelythat there is one single objection that succeeds in refuting allpossible versions of coherentism. Doxastic coherentism, however, seemsparticularly vulnerable to criticism coming from the foundationalistcamp. One of these we considered already: It would seem that doxasticcoherentism makes excessive intellectual demands on believers. Whendealing with the mundane tasks of everyday life, we don't normallybother to form beliefs about the explanatory coherence of our beliefsor the reliability of our belief sources. According to a secondobjection, doxastic coherentism fails by being insensitive to theepistemic relevance of perceptual experiences. Foundationalists couldargue as follows. Suppose Kim is observing a chameleon that rapidlychanges its colors. A moment ago it was blue, now it's purple. Kimstill believes it's blue. Her belief is now unjustified because shebelieves the chameleon is blue even though it looks purple toher. Then the chameleon changes its color back to blue. Now Kim'sbelief that the chameleon is blue is justified again because thechameleon once again looks blue to her. The point would bethat what's responsible for the changing justificatory status of Kim'sbelief is solely the way the chameleon looks to her. Since doxasticcoherentism does not attribute epistemic relevance to perceptualexperiences by themselves, it cannot explain why Kim's belief is firstjustified, then unjustified, and eventually justified again.
Sometimes ignorance is used as an excuse for putative evildoing (Jones1999, 69–70). The argument goes something like this: if an agenthas no good reason to believe that she causes significant harm withoutmoral justification, then she is not morally responsible for causingthis harm because she has no good reason to act otherwise. Forinstance, if Dorian shoots a gun into some bushes on a country estatewithout having any reason to believe that a man is hiding there, he isnot morally responsible for harming a man who is hiding there (thiscase comes from Oscar Wilde's A Picture of Dorian Gray). Inthis way ignorance can be a legitimate excuse for causing unjustifiedharm.
We have seen that explanatory coherentism and reliabilitycoherentism each face its own distinctive circularity problem. Sinceboth are versions of doxastic coherentism, they both face afurther difficulty: Do people, under normal circumstances, really formbeliefs like (1), (2), and (3)? It would seem they do not. It could beobjected, therefore, that these two versions of coherentism makeexcessive intellectual demands of ordinary subjects who are unlikely tohave the background beliefs that, according to these versions ofcoherentism, are needed for justification. This objection could beavoided by stripping coherentism of its doxastic element. The resultwould be the following version of coherentism, which results fromrejecting EB (the epistemic conception of basicality):
This brings me back (after a long, but I hope fruitful journey) to thesubject I began with. When callers ask, Why arent Catholics under theanathema of God since they reject the faith alone formula? one can simply saythat in addition to believing in justification by grace alone and justificationby Christ alone, Catholics also have no problem with justification by faithalone, so long as the kind of faith is understood properlyas formed faith/fidesformata/faith working by charity. Catholics dont normally use the phrasefaith alone for the two reasons indicated above, but they have no problem at allsaying we are justified by faith alone if the faith is understood to beGalatians 5 faith.