There is sometimes a tendency in the literature to equate thenormative concept of legitimacy with justice. Some explicitly definelegitimacy as a criterion of minimal justice (e.g. Hampton 1998;Buchanan 2002). Unfortunately, there is sometimes also a tendency toblur the distinction between the two concepts, and a lot of confusionarises from that. Someone might claim, for example, that whilepolitical authorities such as states are often unjust, only a juststate is morally acceptable and legitimate in this sense. The emergingliterature on realist political theory criticizes this tendency toblur the distinction between legitimacy and justice (e.g. Rossi andSleat 2015), diagnosing it as a sign of misplaced “politicalmoralism” (Williams 2005). Rawls (1993, 1995) clearly distinguishesbetween the two concepts, of course. In his view, while justice andlegitimacy are related—they draw on the same set of politicalvalues—they have different domains and legitimacy makes weakerdemands than justice (1993: 225; 1995: 175ff.). A state may belegitimate but unjust, but the converse is not possible. Pettit (2012:130ff) distinguishes more sharply between the two concepts. Accordingto Pettit, a state is just if it imposes a social order that promotesfreedom as non-domination for all its citizens. It is legitimate if itimposes a social order in an appropriate way. A state that fails toimpose a social order in an appropriate way, however just the socialorder may be, is illegitimate. Vice versa, a legitimate state may failto impose a just social order.
Thanks for your kind efforts. First of all, I have to say this essay is awesome due to the rich ideas you presented.
I have a question. In Thesis statement we always mention three points which are connecting to question, using for example I my opinion and more importantly our opinion. why did not say your opinion in the thesis statement? you just implied that there are other aspects.
David Estlund (2008: 117ff) defends a version of hypothetical consenttheory that matches category (iii). What he calls “normativeconsent” is a theory that regards non-consent to authority,under certain conditions as invalid. Authority, in this view, may thusbe justified without actual consent. Estlund defines authority as themoral power to require action. Estlund uses normative consent theoryas the basis for an account of democratic legitimacy, understood asthe permissibility of using coercion to enforce authority. The workthat normative consent theory does in Estlund’s account is thatit contributes to the justification of the authority of the democraticcollective over those who disagree with certain democraticallyapproved laws.
Historically speaking, the dominant view has been that legitimatepolitical authority entails political obligations. Locke, for example,writes: “every man, by consenting with others to make one bodypolitic under one government, puts himself under an obligation toevery one of that society to submit to the determination of themajority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact,whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signifynothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under no other tiesthan he was in before in the state of nature” (Locke 1990: 52f).
Although consent theory has been dominating for a long time, there aremany well-known objections to it. As mentioned in section 2.1, Simmons(2001) argues that hypothetical consent theories (and, presumably,normative consent theories, too) conflate moral justification withlegitimation. Other objections, especially to Lockean versions, areabout as old as consent theory itself. David Hume, in his essay“Of the Original Contract”, and many after him object toLocke that consent is not feasible, and that actual states have almostalways arisen from acts of violence. The attempt to legitimizepolitical authority via consent is thus, at best, wishful thinking(Wellman 1996). What is worse, it may obscure problematic structuresof subordination (Pateman 1988). Hume’s own solution was, likeBentham later, to propose to justify political authority withreference to its beneficial consequences.
A list of up to five examples that demonstrate the broader impact of the individual's professional and scholarly activities that focuses on the integration and transfer of knowledge as well as its creation. Examples could include, among others: innovations in teaching and training (e.g., development of curricular materials and pedagogical methods); contributions to the science of learning; development and/or refinement of research tools; computation methodologies and algorithms for problem-solving; development of databases to support research and education; broadening the participation of groups underrepresented in STEM; and service to the scientific and engineering community outside of the individuals immediate organization.
Kant’s position on the right to revolution may suggest that heregards political authority as similarly absolute as Hobbes. But Kantstresses that the head of state is bound by the commands of publicreason. This is manifest in his insistence on freedom of the pen:“a citizen must have, with the approval of the ruler himself,the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about what it isin the ruler’s arrangements that seems to him to be a wrongagainst the commonwealth” (Kant Theory and Practice8:304). While there is no right to revolution, political authority isonly legitimate if the head of state respects the social contract. Butpolitical obligations arise even from illegitimate authority. If thehead of state acts in violation of the social contract and hence ofpublic reason, for example by restricting citizens’ freedom ofpolitical criticism, citizens are still obligated to obey.
Is it correct to write therefore in the middle of the sentence. For example you have written “it does not necessarily follow that people without money are, therefore, unhappy.
As a general policy, NSF limits the salary compensation requested in the proposal budget for senior personnel to no more than two months of their regular salary in any one year. This limit includes salary compensation received from all NSF-funded grants. This effort must be documented in accordance with 2 CFR § 200, Subpart E, including 2 CFR § 200.430(i). If anticipated, any compensation for such personnel in excess of two months must be disclosed in the proposal budget, justified in the budget justification, and must be specifically approved by NSF in the award notice budget. Under normal rebudgeting authority, as described in Chapters and , a recipient can internally approve an increase or decrease in person months devoted to the project after an award is made, even if doing so results in salary support for senior personnel exceeding the two month salary policy. No prior approval from NSF is necessary as long as that change would not cause the objectives or scope of the project to change. NSF prior approval is necessary if the objectives or scope of the project change.
Instrumentalist defenses of democracy aim to show that democraticdecision-making procedures are best able to produce legitimateoutcomes. The most famous version of this argument is based on theCondorcet jury theorem (for a recent discussion, see List and Goodin2001). In its original formulation, the Condorcet jury theorem assumesthat there are two alternatives and one of them is the correctoutcome, however defined. Take the latter to be the legitimateoutcome. The theorem says that if each voter is more likely to becorrect than wrong, then a majority of all is also more likely to becorrect than wrong. In addition, the probability that a majority willvote for the correct outcome increases with the size of the body ofvoters. Since democracy has a greater constituency than any otherregime, the theorem gives an argument for why democracy is best ableto generate legitimate outcomes. In addition to arguments based on theCondorcet jury theorem, there are other attempts to defend theinstrumental epistemic value of democracy. Landemore (2012), forexample, offers an argument for the instrumental epistemic value ofdemocracy that rests on the potential of decision-making mechanismsthat bring together diverse perspectives to outperform decision-makingby less diverse groups, e.g. groups of experts.
The contemporary literature has developed Locke’s ideas inseveral ways. John Simmons (2001) uses them to argue that we shoulddistinguish between the moral justification of states in general andthe political legitimacy of actual states. I will come back to thispoint in section 3.3. Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justificationof political authority. According to Raz, political authority is justa special case of the more general concept of authority (1986, 1995,2006). He defines authority in relation to a claim—of a personor an agency—to generate what he calls pre-emptive reasons. Suchreasons replace other reasons for action that people might have. Forexample, if a teacher asks her students to do some homework, sheexpects her say-so to give the students reason to do the homework.